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PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER:
ALICE DOES NOT PERMIT THE DEAD
TO FROLIC IN A

3D WONDERLAND

Hao J. Wu*

N McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America, Inc., the Central
District of California sought to clarify the test for patentable subject
matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 after the Supreme Court's seismic Alice
Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l decision.1 In particular, the court articulated that when determining whether a patent claim is directed to a patent-ineligible subject matter or whether a patent-ineligible claim contains
adequate "inventive concept" to permit patentability, the court must first
eliminate conventional activity from the claim. 2 Applying this method,
the court invalidated several patent claims related to "automatically animating the lip synchronization and facial expressions of three-dimen-3
sional characters" as being directed to patent-ineligible abstract ideas.
Although the court sought to articulate a clear method for identifying
patent-ineligible claims, the court ultimately misapplied the test for patent-eligibility by improperly 4conflating 35 U.S.C. § 102 novelty analysis
and § 101 eligibility analysis.
Plaintiff McRO sued twenty-four separate defendants for direct or indirect infringement of United States Patent Nos. 6,307,576 ('576 Patent)
and 6,611,278 ('278 Patent), each related to methods for "automatically
animating the lip synchronization and facial expressions of 3D characters."'5 Historically, three-dimensional (3D) graphic artists would synchronize lip animations to a sound recording using a manual technique,
known as the "morph target" approach, to assign various 3D-generated
* J.D. Candidate 2017, SMU Dedman School of Law; B.S. in Electrical Engineering,
The University of Texas at Austin, May 2008. Special thanks to my loving family, my caring
friends, and my inspiring professors for all their support and guidance. Also, sincere thanks
to my friend James Wang for encouraging me to enter the law.
1. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am., Inc., CV 12-10327-GW FFMX, 2014
WL 4749601, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2014), argued, No. 15-1080 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 11, 2015);
see Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S.Ct. 2347, 2352 (2014).
2. McRO, 2014 WL 4749601, at *9 (citing Mayo Collaborative Serv. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1298 (2012)).
3. Id. at *1, *13.

4. See id. at *9-11 (applying a point-of-novelty approach for patent-eligibility determinations); 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2011) (establishing subject matter eligibility requirements); 35
U.S.C. § 102 (2011) (establishing novelty requirements for patentability).
5. McRO, 2014 WL 4749601, at *1; U.S. Patent No. 6,307,576 col. 11 1.27-47 (issued
Oct. 23, 2001); U.S. Patent No. 6,611,278 col. 1l 1.42-58 (issued Aug. 26, 2003).
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mouth positions to a variety of "phonemes" ("the smallest unit of
speech . . . corresponding to a single sound"). 6 Rather than animating
every deviation from a neutral mouth position ("morph weight"), 7 3D
artists utilized a "keyframe" approach, in which the artists would manually specify the morph weights at important time intervals, and a separate
computer program would then generate
the morph weights at each ani8
mation frame between the keyframes.
McRO's patents described the aforementioned animation techniques
("prior art") as "tedious, time consuming, and inaccurate," 9 and sought to
provide "an extremely rapid and cost effective means to automatically
create lip synchronization and facial expression in [3D] animated characters." 10 McRO's patents addressed the prior art deficiencies by using automated methods for creating morph weights in relation to a "time[]aligned phonetic transcription" (a chronological transcript of each phoneme in a sound recording). 1 The claimed invention utilized automation
rules to output a sequence of keyframe morph weights based on an inputted time-aligned phonetic transcript or any other form of time-aligned
12
data.
The Central District of California consolidated McRO's twenty-four infringement actions into one suit.' 3 The consolidated defendants jointly
filed a "Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Based on Unpatentability
under 35 U.S.C. § 101. '' 14 The defendants argued that McRO's asserted
'576 and '278 Patent claims were "directed to a fundamental, abstract animation practice, namely, the abstract idea of rules-based synchronization
of animated mouth movement.' 5 Additionally, they argued that the asserted patent claims covered the patent-ineligible abstract idea of "using
rules for [3D] lip synchronization, without requiring specific content for
those rules"'16 and merely "set[ting] forth a previously-known animation
method as a series of mathematical steps, and instruct[ing] [a 3D artist] to
perform those steps on a computer" did not rescue the claims from
17
invalidity.
Although the court initially believed that the asserted '576 and '278
Patent claims were not directed to an abstract idea,' 8 it ultimately granted
6. See McRO, 2014 WL 4749601, at *1; '576 Patent col. 1 I. 34-36 (defining
phonemes).
7. See McRO, 2014 WL 4749601, at *2; '576 Patent col. 1 1. 58-col. 2 1. 1, col. 2 I.
16-22, col. 2 I. 23-28 (defining morph weights).

8. See McRO, 2014 WL 4749601, at *2 (citing '576 Patent col. 2 1.29-34).
9. Id. at *2 (citing '576 Patent col. 2 1. 34-37).
10. Id. (quoting '576 Patent col. 2 t. 50-54).

11. Id. at *1 (quoting '576 Patent col. 2 I. 64-col. 3 t. 12); see also '576 Patent col. 1 1.
32-34 (defining time-aligned phonetic transcript).

12.
13.
14.
15.

McRO, 2014 WL 4749601, at *2 (quoting '576 Patent col. 3 1.3-7).
Id. at *1 nn.1-2.
Id.at *1.
Id.at *7 (quotations omitted).

16. Id.
17. Id.at *3.
18. Id. at *8.
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the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings and invalidated the
asserted claims under § 101 for being directed to an abstract idea. 19 The
court's initial determination rested on the fact that the claims appeared to
be tangible and related to a specific technological process, did not claim a
monopoly on the entire field of animating the human mouth during
speech, and did not cover "prior art methods of computer assisted, but
non-automated, lip synchronization for three-dimensional computer animation."'20 It was only after stripping away elements of the asserted patent claims that were already present in the prior art, including the morph
target and keyframe approaches, that the court concluded that the asserted claims only added "the use of rules, rather than artists, to set the
morph weights and [keyframe] transitions between phonemes . . . specified at the highest level of generality."'21 The court interpreted the asserted claims as not disclosing any specific automation rules and leaving
the ultimate creation of rules to 3D artists. 22 The court then concluded
that since the patent claims covered "all such [automation] rules," the
asserted '576 and '278 Patent claims effectively preempted the entire field
and
of "lip synchronization using a rules-based morph target approach"
23
was therefore directed to a patent-ineligible abstract idea.
35 U.S.C. § 101 broadly defines "the subject matter eligible for patent
protection" 24 as "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof .... -25 The Supreme Court has limited the scope of patentable
subject matter by establishing "three specific exceptions to § 101's broad
patent-eligibility principles: 'laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.'"26 By prohibiting patents on these fundamental concepts,
the patent system prevents individuals from "wholly pre-empt[ing]"'27public access to the "basic tools of scientific and technological work."
In Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, the Supreme Court expanded a two-step patent-eligibility test, first articulated in Mayo Collaborative Serv. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., to govern all § 101 eligibility
19. Id.at *13; see also 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2011) (reciting subject matter eligibility
requirements).
20. McRO, 2014 WL 4749601, at *8.
21. Id.at *11.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014).
25. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2011) ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title.").
26. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 601 (2010) (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447
U.S. 303, 309 (1980)); see also Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133
S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013) (reiterating that "[f]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable").
27. Bilski, 561 U.S. at 658 (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981)
(Breyer, J., concurring); Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309; Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63,
67, 72 (1972)).
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determinations. 28 First, a court must determine "whether the claims at
issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts"-"laws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas."'2 9 Although the Alice
Court did not "delimit the precise contours of the 'abstract ideas' category," Supreme Court precedent indicates that abstract ideas encompass
"mathematical algorithms, including those executed on a generic computer," and "some fundamental economic and conventional business
practices."' 30 Second, if the claims at issue are directed to patent-ineligible
concepts, a court must determine whether any part of the patent claims
contain an "inventive concept"-"an element or combination of elements
that is sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to signifi'3 1
cantly more than a patent upon the [patent-ineligible concept] itself.
Although a patent claim covering an unpatentable abstract idea is not
saved by simply "[s]tating [the] abstract idea while adding the words 'apply it"' 32 or by "limiting the use of [the] abstract idea 'to a particular
technological environment,"' 33 a claim covering an unpatentable abstract
idea is patent-eligible if it "improve[s] an existing technological
'34
process."
In determining the patent-eligibility of the asserted '576 and '278 Patent claims, the district court stated that "it is not enough to view the
claims in isolation," instead, any "well-understood, routine, conventional
activity previously used in the field" must first be filtered out of the
claimed invention. 35 Therefore, "where a [patent] claim recites tangible
steps, but the only new part of the claim is an abstract idea," the claim
may be characterized as seeking to patent an abstract idea. 36 The court
justified this "point-of-novelty" approach to patent-eligibility by emphasizing the Supreme Court's historical concern with "patents that consist
of old material with the addition of a new, but abstract, idea .... ,,37 After
removing prior art elements from the asserted patent claims, the court
concluded that the point-of-novelty for the asserted claims involved the
"idea of using rules, including timing rules, to automate the process of
generating keyframes" and "set[ting] the morph weights and transitions
between phonemes. '38 Believing that the asserted claims specified rules28. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (citing Mayo Collaborative Serv. v. Prometheus Labs.,
Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1296-97 (2012)).
29. Id. at 2354-55; see also Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2116.
30. DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(citing Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2356; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611-12; Benson, 409 U.S. at 64.
31. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355.
32. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358 (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294).
33. Id. (quoting Bilski, 561 U.S. at 610-11).
34. Id. at 2358.
35. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am., Inc., CV 12-10327-GW FFMX, 2014
WL 4749601, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2014), argued, No. 15-1080 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 11,2015);
see Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2352 (2014) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
36. Id.
37. Id. (citing Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 371 (1938)).
38. Id. at *10-11.
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based generation of morph weights and keyframes "at the highest level of
generality" and that "the user, not the patent, provides the rules," the
court reasoned that the claims preempted "the field of [] lip synchronization using a rules-based morph target approach" and was therefore an
39
impermissible patent on an abstract idea.
By filtering out all conventional activities from the asserted '576 and
'278 Patent claims before engaging in step one of the Alice/Mayo patenteligibility test, the district court improperly conflated § 101 eligibility
analysis with § 102 novelty analysis. Despite summarizing the Alice/Mayo
test's first step as "[i]f the claim is not directed to a patent-ineligible concept, then the test stops at step one," 40 the court did not abide by its own
instructions. 4 1 Instead of terminating the patent-eligibility analysis after
the court initially determined that the asserted claims were not directed
to an abstract idea, 42 the court proceeded to borrow the inventive concept analysis of the Alice/Mayo test's second step, filtering out any conventional or regular activity and recharacterizing the asserted claims as
being directed to a patent-ineligible abstract idea. 43 Although the Supreme Court has recognized that there might be some overlap between
§ 101 patent-eligibility analysis and § 102 novelty analysis, this has been
limited to the Alice/Mayo test's second step, the search for an inventive
concept. 44 Against its own sage advice, the district court resurrected a
long-discarded point-of-novelty approach to patent-eligibility by first applying the Alice/Mayo test's second step to ascertain the novel elements
of the asserted patent claims, before returning to the Alice/Mayo test's
first step to characterize the claims as being directed to a patent-ineligible
45
abstract idea.
The district court's erroneous application of the point-of-novelty approach is contrary to the Supreme Court's modern patent-eligibility jurisprudence. The Supreme Court long ago abandoned the point-of-novelty
approach, clarifying that "[i]t is inappropriate to dissect [patent] claims
into old and new elements and then to ignore the presence of the old
elements in the analysis."'46 Carried to its extreme, the process of "dissecting a claim into old and new elements" in a quest to find a patentineligible abstract idea would "make all inventions unpatentable because
all inventions can be reduced to underlying principles of nature which,
once known, make their implementation obvious." '47 Since patent claims
39. Id. at *11.
40. Id. at *4 (internal quotation marks omitted) (summarizing Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v.
CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014)).
41. Id. at *10.
42. Id. at *9.
43. Id. at *9-10.
44. See Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1304

(2012).
45. McRO, 2014 WL 4749601, at *9-11.
46. Cal. Inst. of Tech. v. Hughes Commc'ns Inc., 59 F. Supp. 3d 974, 982 (C.D. Cal.
2014) (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981)).
47. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 189 n.12.
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that disclose new combinations of well-known steps may be patentable,
"the 'novelty' of any element or steps in a process" is irrelevant for § 101
48
patent-eligibility analysis.
Although the Central District of California erroneously invalidated
several of McRO's '576 and '278 Patent claims by utilizing a point-ofnovelty approach and applying the Alice/Mayo patent-eligibility test out
of order, this does not mean that the disputed '576 and '278 Patents
claims are not invalid. Whether these claims can survive § 102's novelty
requirement, § 103's non-obviousness requirement, § 112's enablement
requirement, or any other patentability requirement provided by Title 35
of the United States Code is a separate question. 49 Furthermore, since
McRO has appealed the Central District of California's judgment to the
Federal Circuit, the Defendants-Appellees, along with a supporting ami50
cus brief, have made alternative § 101 patent-ineligibility arguments.
Because this case places into question the patentability of software in
general, 5 1 the legal community considers the McRO appeal to be one of
the most important technology cases of 2015.52
On December 11, 2015, Federal Circuit Judges Jimmie Reyna, Richard
Taranto, and Kara Stoll heard oral arguments on McRO's appeal. 53 Recognizing the Supreme Court's lack of guidance in determining abstractness, Judge Stoll questioned both McRO and the Defendants-Appellees
on how to determine whether a patent claim is directed to an abstract
idea. 54 Judge Taranto compared McRO's patents to a hypothetical patent
teaching automation rules for implementing the unknown, inner workings
48. Hughes, 59 F. Supp. 3d at 982 (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188-89).
49. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2011) (establishing that "[w]hoever invents or discovers
any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions
and requirements of this title") (emphasis added), with 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2011) (establishing
novelty requirement for patentability), and 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2011) (establishing non-obviousness requirement for patentability), and 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2011) (establishing written
description, enablement, and best mode requirements for patentability).
50. See Corrected Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games
Am., Inc., (Fed. Cir. Dec. 11, 2015) (No. 15-1080), 2015 WL 1205511; Brief of DefendantsAppellees, McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am., Inc., (Fed. Cir. Dec. 11, 2015) (No.
15-1080), 2015 WL 3819567; Brief of the Electronic Frontier Foundation as Amici Curiae
Supporting Defendants-Appellees, McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am., Inc., (Fed.
Cir. Dec. 11, 2015) (No. 15-1080), 2015 WL 3970276.
51. Hughes, 59 F. Supp. 3d at 990 ("[I]t is difficult to imagine any software patent that
survives under McRO's approach-most inventions today build on what is known in the
art, and an improvement to software will almost inevitably be an algorithm or concept
which, when viewed in isolation, will seem abstract. This analysis would likely render all
software patents ineligible, contrary to Congress's wishes.").
52. See Kelly Knaub, Technology Cases to Watch in 2015, LAw360 (Jan. 2, 2015, 4:06
PM ET), http://www.law360.com/articles/600924/technology-cases-to-watch-in-2015 [perma
.cc/LX9Y-3BF5].
53. Michael Macagnone, Fed. Circ. Questions Application of Alice to Lip-Sync Tech,
LAw360 (Dec. 11, 2015, 5:24 PM ET), http://www.law360.com/articles/717673/fed-circ-questions-application-of-alice-to-lip-sync-tech [perma.cc/22FY-T7AF].
54. Oral Argument, McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am., Inc., UNITD SrATP3S
COUi'T OF APPEALS FOR THEI FEDERAL CIRCUrr, at 10:22-10:50, 20:44-21:06, http://
oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=2015-1080.mp3 [perma.cc/5GAF-MNYN]
[hereinafter McRO Oral Arguments].
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of a human brain when recognizing faces, which seem to be an "unbelievably patentable invention. '55 The Defendants-Appellees, echoing the district judge, 56 argued that even if the idea of automated lip-syncing rules
are patentable, McRO's patents were patent-ineligible because they
failed to disclose specific automation rules.57 In response, the panel questioned whether the lack of specific automation rules is actually a § 112
enablement issue, instead of a § 101 eligibility issue. 58 Further, Judge
Reyna questioned whether the district judge committed legal error by inventing a "third step" for patent-eligibility analysis-stripping out all conventional activity present in the prior art when determining whether a
59
patent claim is direct to an abstract idea.
The Central District of California's decision in McRO, Inc. v. Bandai
Namco Games America, Inc. brings discord, not clarity, to § 101 patenteligibility analysis. 60 While the Alice Court left the responsibility of determining when the two-part patent-eligibility test is satisfied to the Federal
Circuit and the district courts,6 1 the McRO decision ignores the warnings
of Supreme Court precedent and has the potential to greatly limit the
range of human invention.

55. Macagnone, supra note 53; McRO Oral Arguments, supra note 54, at 12:38-13:19.
56. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am., Inc., CV 12-10322-GW FFMX, 2014
WL 4749601, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2014), argued, No. 15-1080 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 11,

2015).
57. Macagnone, supra note 53; McRO Oral Arguments, supra note 54, at 13:19-15:20.
58. McRO Oral Arguments, supra note 54, at 15:20-20:44, 27:00-29:20; see also 35
U.S.C. § 112 (2011) (establishing that "[t]he [patent] specification shall contain ... the
manner and process of making and using [the invention], in such full, clear, concise, and
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is
most nearly connected, to make and use the [invention] ...
.").
59. Macagnone, supra note 53; McRO Oral Arguments, supra note 54, at 24:39-25:32.
60. See Cal. Inst. of Tech. v. Hughes Commc'ns Inc., 59 F. Supp. 3d 974, 988-90 (C.D.
Cal. 2014) (criticizing McRO as reaching the wrong conclusion).
61. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am., Inc., CV 12-10327-GW FFMX, 2014
WL 4749601, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2014), argued, No. 15-1080 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 11, 2015);
see also Hughes, 59 F. Supp. 3d at 986 ( "When the Supreme Court leaves questions open,
lower courts have a duty to offer their views and develop the law. Lower courts have
endeavored to fulfill this responsibility with regard to § 101, but the resulting decisions
demonstrate the continuing uncertainty surrounding software patentability.").

306

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

